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I n 2016, when Canadians were asked to fill out the mandatory census, theywere asked “what is [your] sex?” with only two options available: femaleand male. Activists immediately raised concerns about this question: what
option were nonbinary respondents supposed to choose?1 Statistics Canada
representatives responded that trans and intersex Canadians should select
the gender with which they most associate themselves or leave the question
blank and indicate in the comments their reason(s) for choosing not to an-
swer that question (Kupfer 2016), and they were promised a public consul-
tation on the topic ahead of the 2021 Census, which is currently underway
(Grant 2018).
This issue speaks to the growing activism of trans people and the resulting
visibility of questions about gender and gender identity.2 It also speaks to the
difficulty of asking about gender and sex in a coherent and inclusive way in
large-scale surveys. For example, while Statistics Canada’s census question
used the term “sex,” their representatives responded by using “gender.”
Yet the two are not synonymous. It has become common to define sex as a
medical and social categorization assigned at birth, based on a set of biolog-
ical attributes, while gender is a fundamental aspect of self-identity that
can be expressed through roles, behaviors, appearances, or identities (CIHR
2015). Someone’s sex, then, can differ from their gender. Asking about sex
versus gender means collecting different data. Simply adding a nonbinary
option to the census question may create confusion if the terminology used
This study was funded by grant #MOP 119472 from the Canadian Institutes of Health
Research.
1 We use “nonbinary” as an (imperfect) umbrella term for people whose gender falls out-
side of the binary categories of men and women.
2 We use the word “trans” as an umbrella term to be inclusive of people who identity as
trans, transgender, transsexual, and nonbinary, although we recognize the limits of this inclu-
sion (Davidson 2007).
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is not understood similarly by everyone. When we designed the first iteration
of the Canadian Trans Youth Health Survey (CTYHS) in 2013, one of our
goals was to provide some insights into questions about gender identity
and how researchers can best ask about gender and sex in large-scale popu-
lation surveys in order to account for people of all genders, whether they be
trans or cisgender.3 In this article, we use data from this survey to illustrate
youth respondents’ nuanced, multiple, and at times inconsistent understand-
ings of gender and sex. We show that youth used the language of social con-
struction andbioessentialism inways that both converge in how they legitimize
trans people’s genders and yet also sit in tension with each other because they
suggest very different ways of redoing or undoing notions of sex and gender.
A key observation from some trans youth respondents’ understandings of
sex and gender is that while mainstream discourse constructs sex as fixed and
gender as mutable, some CTYHS respondents articulated an opposite per-
spective: that gender is fixed and sex is mutable. Many respondents—partic-
ularly binary trans youth—framed gender as the core of a person’s inner
“truth,” with transition representing a way to correct a person’s assigned
sex at birth. We partly attribute this to the popularity of narratives about
“being born in the wrong body” or having a “boy brain in a girl’s body,”
which frames trans subjectivities as medical problems withmedical solutions.
Youth challenged the authority granted tomedical actors who assigned their
sex at birth, even as some reinvested it through medical interventions like
hormone replacement therapies and/or gender-affirming surgeries. Invert-
ing social constructionist and essentialist perspectives on gender and sex,
this perspective demonstrates how youth do, undo, and redo trans subjectiv-
ities in a cultural context that increasingly recognizes them. We conclude by
exploring the implications these understandings have for how we incorpo-
rate questions about gender and sex into our research, including the need
to continually engage youth in research design.
Literature review
Before our analysis of how youth discussed gender and sex in the CTYHS,
these discussions should be contextualized within a history of feminist schol-
arship that has grappled with how to define them. First- and second-wave
feminists (e.g., Terman and Miles 1936; Millett 1970) were among the first
to question assumptions about men/masculinity and women/femininity,
which society often perceived as emerging from innate and fundamental
3 People who are cisgender identify with the gender and sex that they were assigned at birth
(Erickson-Schroth 2014, 612).
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biological differences. The primary objective for these writers was to chal-
lenge the notion that sex characteristics are inherently and inevitably con-
nected to gender roles—in other words, that sex (in its physiological sense)
determines gender (in the sense of gendered behaviors and attitudes). For
instance, Simone de Beauvoir (1952) put forth the notion that one is not
born a woman but becomes one—meaning that femininity is socially con-
structed. Femininity is not a biological fact but rather a product of a patriar-
chal society that creates labels, stereotypes, roles, and other preconceived
categories it assigns to women based on their physical sex.
In the decades that followed, third-wave feminists began to question this
metanarrative approach. Judith Butler (1990) challenged the realist ontolog-
ical assumptions of Beauvoir and others, arguing that such perspectives con-
tinued to dichotomize men and women while naturalizing sex. By defining
the term “woman,” these feminists, albeit unintentionally, implied that there
is a correct and fixed way to be a gendered woman (Butler 1990, 5). Instead,
Butler (1990) argues that sex, like gender, is not a prediscursive entity but
a normative framework that ultimately justifies the oppression of women,
nonheterosexual people, and transgender people. Instead of concentrating
on how gender is either rooted in the individual or enacted through institu-
tions, Candace West and Don Zimmerman (1987) proposed the concept of
“doing gender,” whereby gender is an achieved status. Because individuals
evaluate gender in interaction, it is observable in a diverse range of behaviors
such as conversation, appearance, activities, gestures, and body language.
This interactional aspect both encourages and fortifies gender.
These perspectives, too, have been subject to feminist critique. For in-
stance, theories of intersectionality maintain that analyses of social phenom-
ena should examine overlapping systems of oppression such as racism, sexism,
classism, and homophobia (Crenshaw 1991; Collins 2009; Meyer 2012). In
relation to transphobic systems of oppression, Joanne Meyerowitz (2002)
critiques Michel Foucault’s (1978) genealogical assessment in his work on
the history of sexuality. Instead, she argues that the restructuring of (trans)
sexuality transpired asymmetrically and over a longer period of time, and that
it was negotiated through interrelated factors, including race, class, region,
and nation.
Others have suggested that social constructionist theories fail to take into
account human agency and acts of resistance. Francine Deutsch (2007), for
example, argues that the problem with doing gender is that one is judged in
accordancewith such norms regardless of whether one conforms to gendered
norms or resists them. Instead of doing gender, Deutsch and others (Butler
2004; Risman 2009) suggest undoing gender, which refers to social interac-
tions that reduce gender differences in order to create opportunities for
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change. Catherine Connell (2010) takes this idea a step further with her con-
cepts of redoing gender and doing transgender. She contends that trans indi-
viduals may redo gender bymodifying normative beliefs of gender in their so-
cial interactions, even as they may contribute to doing gender in other ways.
Many transwriters have indeedwritten about the transgressive potential of
trans people to undo some elements of the dominant binary gender system.4
Others have focused on the affirmation that some trans people find in the cur-
rent binary gender system, noting that trans people are not solely responsible
for reproducing or challenging gender binaries (Namaste 2000, 2011;
Serano 2007). This debate is intimately connected to the complicated rela-
tionship that trans people, particularly trans women, have to feminism
(Serano 2013). As Connell (2010) concludes, even though trans individuals
are not always undoing or redoing gender, they are—evenmore so than their
cisgender counterparts—always tasked with navigating between sex, gender,
and the expectations associated with each.
This navigation is precisely what this article seeks to explore by looking at
how young trans people engaged with different understandings of gender
and sex in the CTYHS. The above literature review has illustrated how schol-
ars have theorized sex and gender in ways that have created opportunities to
understand and validate trans people’s experiences. This scholarship is also a
call to think critically about the way that binary sex categories are socially
imposed and erase the complexity of human biology, to the detriment of
intersex people, whose bodies are often the site of nonconsensual medical
interventions (Fausto-Sterling 2012; Davis 2015). By challenging the as-
sumption that gender always flows directly from the sex one is assigned at
birth, the writings of these critical gender scholars, feminists, and trans activ-
ists make it possible to imagine not only having a gender that differs from
one’s sex assigned at birth but also having nonbinary and fluid genders. It be-
comes possible for all individuals to do, undo, and redo these normative gen-
dered states in ways that feel validating to them.
Method
The Canadian Trans Youth Health Survey was a large bilingual study of the
health and well-being of trans and gender-diverse youth (ages 14–25) living
in Canada with data collected during 2013 and 2014. Several members of
the core research team (which includes the authors) were transgender or
gender diverse. We also formed transgender youth advisory groups in British
4 See Bornstein (1995), Califia (1997), Feinberg (1998), and Wilchins (2013).
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Columbia, Alberta, Ontario, andNova Scotia to work with us on developing
the survey and to help us to interpret the results. We also shared the survey
with health professionals who provided clinical services for transgender youth
throughout Canada, and many of these shared the link to our survey with
their service users.
The survey involved a comprehensive set of questions about physical
health, emotional health, and social factors affecting health (e.g. race/ethnic-
ity, socioeconomic status, geography). We also queried about stigmatizing
experiences and factors that build resilience (e.g., supportive family, positive
self-esteem, community involvement). A total of 923 people responded to
the questionnaire from all ten Canadian provinces and the Northwest Terri-
tories. As part of our efforts to determine the best way to ask about gender,
we also included multiple questions about gender identity and gendered
health that researchers have used in clinical services and in other large-scale
health surveys, which were developedwith varying degrees of community in-
volvement and limited testing with trans youth. It is important that these
questions are acceptable to trans youth, so we sought to evaluate what youth
thought of questions. Using a scale of 1–5, we asked participants to rate how
much they liked each question (from “I hated it” to “I liked it a lot”) and how
much they thought the response options fit them (from “not likeme at all” to
“very much like me”). We then invited participants to give optional com-
ments about these questions in an open-ended text box, and also provided
an open-ended text box for respondents to leave feedback at the end of
the survey. The exact questions, their response options, the source of the
question, and the number of comments are given in table 1. The comments
from the open-ended text boxes became the data we used for analysis.
In total, 324 participants gave comments for at least one of these gender
questions in our survey. Table 2 gives an overview of their demographics.
The geographic dispersion of participants across provinces and territories was
similar to the general population. In terms of gender, 38 percent were (trans-
gender) boys or men, 13 percent were (transgender) girls or women, and the
remaining 49 percent reported other nonbinary gender identities. Among re-
spondents who provided comments, a higher proportion were nonbinary than
thosewhodid not provide comments (36 percent nonbinary). The average age
of participants who provided comments was 20 years old, the same as those
who did not provide comments. The most common race/ethnicities reported
were white and Indigenous (including First Nations, Inuit, and Métis).
Most large-scale quantitative surveys, like the ones that most of our ques-
tions about gender came from, are developed within positivist or postpositivist
paradigms that tend to focus on dimensions of identity separately, as if they
were unidimensional and mutually exclusive, which often fails to capture
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When a person’s sex and gender do not
match, they might think of themselves
as transgender. Sex is what a person is
born. Gender is how a person feels.
Which one response best describes
you?a,b
I am not transgender; I am trans-
gender and identify as a boy or
man; I am transgender and iden-
tify as a girl or woman; I am
transgender and identify in some
other way
214
What sex were you assigned at birth?c Male; Female 38
If you are Aboriginal, do you identify
as Two Spirit?d,e
No; Yes; I’m not Aboriginal 77
Do you identify as transgender?d No; Yes 126
Do you identify as trans*? (Trans*
includes transgender, transsexual,
transitioned, gender queer, and
some two spirited people.)f
No; Yes 117
Are you currently living in your felt
gender?c
Yes, full-time; Yes, part-time; No 90
What is your gender identity? (Mark all
that apply)c,g
Boy or man; Girl or woman; FTM;
MTF; Trans boy or trans man;
Trans girl or trans woman; Feel
like a girl sometimes; Feel like a




we have missed your identity,
please share it
122
a“Youth Risk Behavior Surveillance System” (CDC 2006). This measure was tested with
30 cisgender and transgender adolescents; it was originally developed for use in a self-
administered, anonymous health survey in a population-based adolescent sample.
b“Massachusetts Youth Health Survey” (Massachusetts Department of Public Health,
Massachusetts Department of Elementary and Secondary Education 2015).
cTransPULSE Survey (http://transpulseproject.ca/wp-content/uploads/2012/05
/Trans-PULSE-survey-information-only-copy-2012.pdf ). For more information, see
http://transpulseproject.ca/resources/trans-pulse-survey/.
dFrom Hastings Street to Haida Gwaii (Smith et al. 2014).
e“Ontario Student Drug Use and Health Survey” (CAMH 2013).
f Item created by research team, based on current language at the time of the survey, in
order to test it among youth participants.
gParticipants could choose more than one race/ethnicity. Those who responded as white
and one other race/ethnicity are listed here as that other race/ethnicity. Those who re-
sponded as more than one nonwhite race/ethnicity were listed as multiethnic (Bauer
et al. 2009).
people’s complex experience of their identities.Drawing on the insightfulwork
of Lisa Bowleg (2008), our epistemological approach to the data is to under-
take a mixed methodological approach via a largely quantitative survey with
qualitative narratives in order to provide a “contextualized scientificmethod”
(Bowleg 2008, 320). As JeanneMarecek (2003, 63) writes: “Whether num-
bers or words, data do not speak for themselves; they acquire meaning only
within a framework of interpretation created by the researcher.” By examin-
ing howparticipants speak back to the waywe collected data, we seek to draw
attention to researchers’ frameworks of interpretation that shape these ques-
tions, as well as the way that they are experienced by youth.
We used thematic analysis to interpret the comments. Thematic analysis is a
qualitative researchmethod that aims to identify, analyze, and report patterns in
thedata (BraunandClarke2006,79).Ourapproachwasboth inductive andde-
ductive, meaning that we developed themes linked to the data themselves and
informed by our team’s theoretical interest in how best to account for gender
in research. Our analytical approach was semantic in that we identified themes
“within the explicit or surface meanings of the data” (Braun and Clarke 2006,
84). Although our focus is on explicit meanings, we also offer some theoretical
insights into the significance and implications of what youth shared with us.
Table 2. Demographics of the Sample




Spoken at Home (%)
14 (2) Alberta (11) White only (76) <1 year (1) English only (75)
15 (4) British Columbia (25) Indigenous (9) 1–2 years (1) French only (5)
16 (7) Manitoba (4) Black (2) 3–5 years (3) English and French (9)
17 (9) New Brunswick (3) Central American/
South American (1)
≥6 years (9) English and another
language (7)
18 (8) Newfoundland and
Labrador (4)
West Asian or Arab (2) Entire life (87) French and another
language (1)
19 (13) Northwest Territories (1) Southeast Asian (1) Other (3)
20 (9) Nova Scotia (6) South Asian (2)
21 (11) Ontario (30) East Asian (5)
22 (8) Prince Edward Island (<1) Multiethnic (3)
23 (11) Québec (14) Other (1)
24 (10) Saskatchewan (3)
25 (9)
Note: Participants could choose more than one identity. Those who responded as white
and one other race/ethnicity are listed here as that other race/ethnicity. Those who re-
sponded as more than one nonwhite race are listed as multiethnic.
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We faced a few challenges analyzing the data. The first was the anonymous
online format.Many of the comments respondents provided were brief, single-
sentence answers. Furthermore, participant attrition, which is common in large
online youth health surveys, meant that questions presented later in the survey
often had fewer responses. Unlike in-depth interviews where researchers can
probe for further clarification and detail, researchers have little control over
whether or how participants answer questions on online surveys. The second
challenge concerns our sampling strategy. Given the small size of the Canadian
trans youth population, we used a convenience rather than a purposive sam-
pling approach. Although this yielded a relatively diverse sample, it was not nec-
essarily representative. Despite our best efforts, this made it difficult for us to
establish clear patterns among respondents’ answers according to race/ethnic-
ity, age, or province (we did not ask questions about income or socioeconomic
status). We have indicated areas where patterns existed by gender, with the ex-
ception of transfeminine identities. Because transfeminine respondents left the
fewest comments, we were hesitant to make claims based on a comparatively
smaller data set. Instead, we selected comments to quote in this article to reflect
the diversity of genders and location across many provinces.
Findings
In the next sections, we review the different ways that youth discussed gen-
der and sex in response to our questions. Finding common terminology is
not easy: David Valentine (2007) traces the complexity of “transgender” as
a collective category for self-identity and activism rooted in various histories
and cultures. Meanings about trans identities continue to fluctuate depend-
ing on context as well as personal and political goals. For example, people
may identify themselves differently on a survey than they do in their local
communities depending on trust levels or if they deem it important for re-
searchers to “count” them in a particular way. Some of our respondents
spoke explicitly to the uncertainty they felt about what language to use:
one respondent noted that he had witnessed “a massive controversy . . .
about what the terms ‘transgender,’ ‘transsexual,’ ‘trans*,’ and ‘ftm’mean”
(20, transmasculine, BC). Although we cannot know about the specific ten-
sions behind this respondent’s comment, his words highlight continuous
movement and struggle around how people create meaning from these cat-
egories. These types of tensions can be the result of the multiple ways of
talking about gender and sex that we trace in this article. While some youth
drew on the language of social construction to affirm their identities and
question gendered and sexed binaries, others embraced binary gender terms
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while distancing themselves from any trans-related labels. Some also evoked
modern essentialist understandings of gender and sex to define themselves
through the notion of transsexualism. These different articulations suggest
different ways of redoing (or undoing) gender through language, with a
shared goal of affirming the legitimacy of trans people’s genders.
Using social construction to assert the truth of gender
A number of youth—especially nonbinary youth—used the language of so-
cial construction explicitly in their comments. Stating, for example, that
“sex and gender are social constructs” (14, nonbinary, Ontario) and that
“sex is not ‘what a person is born,’ sex is a made up (white, colonialist) idea”
(17, nonbinary, Ontario), many youth directly responded to a question that
started with a purposefully simplistic definition: “When a person’s sex and
gender do not match, they might think of themselves as transgender. Sex
is what a person is born. Gender is how a person feels.” Many respondents
disliked this definition, reading it as “essentialism” (24, nonbinary, Alberta).
In other words, youth perceived this question as reinforcing the notion that
sex assigned at birth is the original “truth” of a person, as this comment
shows: “What I don’t like about this question is how it insinuates that the
sex you are assigned at birth is more natural than your gender identity”
(24, transfeminine, Ontario). This definition was interpreted as framing sex
as more legitimate than gender. This is likely because of the opposition be-
tween the verbs “to feel” and “to be,” given that what someone feels (here,
gender) is often seen as less fundamental than what someone is (here, sex).
In rejecting what they saw as the implied naturalness of sex, youth—espe-
cially those over the age of 18—explicitly referred to the power of authority fig-
ures such as doctors to determine the “truth” of someone’s sex: “Sex is not just
what someone is born, it is what they are assigned by doctors and society at
large” (23, nonbinary, Québec). They often challenged this institutional power,
as this 25-year-old transmasculine respondent from Ontario did: “Your defi-
nitions of sex andgenderwere very clinical and reflect the institutional discrim-
ination of trans people on the part of the medical and psychiatric institutions.
It assumes that the sex doctors assigned a person at birth is the ‘right’ sex.” By
describing sex as assignment—an interpretative process that assumes that cer-
tain external physiological characteristics are inherently connected to one of
two dimorphic sexes and to their related binary gender categories—youth ex-
plicitly challenged the common understanding of sex as a straightforward fac-
tual description of bodies. As one 20-year-old transfeminine youth from On-
tario explained, “sex is not gendered, it just means someone has certain body
parts but they do not have a gender inherently attached to them.” In other
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words, “physicians conflate sex& gender when they declare us ‘boy’ or ‘girl’”
(24, nonbinary, BC). In critiquing the survey questions in this way, youth
demonstrated an awareness and refusal of the cisnormative assumption that
sex characteristics inevitably define gender.5 And although their comments
rarely mentioned this lineage explicitly, they also echo antiessentialist coun-
ternarratives developedby critical gender scholars, feminists, and trans activists
to challenge dominant understandings of gender and sex.
Questioning the sex binary
Emphasizing gender as a medical and social process, some youth went beyond
challenging the primacy usually given to a person’s sex assigned at birth. In-
stead, they offered a larger critique of sex as “just as much constructed as gen-
der” (23, nonbinary, Ontario), characterizing both as “free flowing” and
“never fixed” (19, transfeminine, Atlantic Provinces). Specifically, they ques-
tioned sex as binary or that there are only two sexes. As one 19-year-old trans-
masculine youth from British Columbia noted, “the notion of ‘sex’ is made
up by society based on a variety of traits which give more variety than what
two binary ideas of gender allow (chromosomes, genitals, hormone levels,
etc.).” These comments echo academic and activist challenges to the bioes-
sentialist notion that binary sex assignments are straightforward, objective
descriptions of “purely” biological differences. Anne Fausto-Sterling (2000,
2012), for example, has long questioned how science frames sex as a binary
category while neglecting the complexities of the sex-based spectrum and
its many variables (see especially Fausto-Sterling 2012). The following com-
ment makes this critique explicit by using academic language: “Sex is a social
construct and no one is born with one, they’re assigned one by the people
around them. . . . Bioessentialism (‘born as’ [sex]) and the sex binary are
cissexist” (22, nonbinary, Ontario). This comment both criticizes the notion
that sex is an innate and fixed part of who we are (bioessentialism) and the
notion that sex is a binary. In doing so, this comment evokes Butler’s (1990)
argument that it is the understanding of gender as a fixed binary that makes
sex intelligible as such, rather than the other way around.
Others discussed the mutability of sex. As one youth commented, “sex
isn’t only what we are born as. We can change our sex. Also, we can define
our own sex. It’s worth reconsidering the definition of sex a little bit more”
5 Greta Bauer at al. define “cisnormativity” as the expectation that “those assigned male
at birth always grow up to be men and those assigned female at birth always grow up to be
women” (2009, 356).
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(24, transmasculine, Atlantic Provinces).6 This comment takes the possibil-
ity of self-determination even further—although it is not clear exactly what
this self-determination would look like when it comes to sex rather than
gender. While some aspects of sex can be altered, others (such as chromo-
somes) cannot. What may be possible, however, is to rethink what appropri-
ate sexed bodies look like and to expand the definitions of “female” or
“male” bodies. Although very few youth mentioned intersex people explic-
itly, this comment and others also call to mind the work of intersex academ-
ics and activists who contest how medical impositions and surgical interven-
tions shape bodies into binary compliance (Davis 2015; Wilcox, Côté, and
Pagé 2015). It is also possible that the young person who wrote this com-
ment used “sex” and “gender” interchangeably, without distinguishing
between them. While there is too little context to determine that with cer-
tainty, this ambiguity highlights the difficulty of discussing gender and sex
when speakers frequently conflate them in everyday language and imbue
them with different meanings.
The comments discussed in the past two sections challenge commonplace,
binary understandings of sex and gender by emphasizing both as socially con-
structed. In this sense, these comments speak to the complexity of finding clear
and shared definitions at a time when they are in constant flux. These com-
ments also express a desire to foreground the rights of trans people to define
their genders and sexes on their own terms. Although it is not always clear from
the short comments exactly how youth envision this self-determination, this
perspective clearly seeks to legitimize the genders of trans people whilemaking
space for nonbinary, intersex, and gender-nonconforming subjectivities.
Asserting gender as a fact
The importance of being able to assert one’s gender was also present in com-
ments that did not explicitly draw upon the language of social construction.
For example, several comments expressed a dislike for the phrase “gender is
how a person feels.” These youth argued against the notion that gender is
something that they feel rather than something that simply is. “Gender isn’t
a feeling,” explained a 15-year-old transmasculine respondent from Ontario.
Another respondent expandedon this sentiment: “sometimeswhenpeople de-
scribe gender identity as a ‘feeling,’ I feel as though it minimises my identity
and makes it come off to others that I am not really a man, and that I just feel
6 Due to low number of respondents, we aggregated quotes from the four Atlantic Prov-
inces (New Brunswick, Prince Edward Island, Nova Scotia, and Newfoundland and Labrador)
as well as the Prairie Provinces of Manitoba and Saskatchewan.
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like one” (16, transmasculine, Ontario). In some narratives, respondents used
caps lock or other forms of typography to emphasize that using the verb
“feel” minimized their gender: “I don’t *feel* like a girl, I AM a girl” (19,
transfeminine, BC). Others expressed similar frustrations regarding the lan-
guage of gender identity: “I do not identify as transsexual, I just AM” (19,
transmasculine, BC). “What exactly is a transgender identity?,” one 20-year-
old transfeminine youth from Québec wrote: “I am trans* It’s a fact, not a
choice” (translation ours).7
These comments express concerns about how, for “all the [political]
power of transgender as a category of identity” (Valentine 2007, 6), lan-
guage can also minimize the legitimacy of trans people’s genders in a society
where trans repudiation is institutionalized (Namaste 2000; Shelley 2008;
Spade 2011). By rejecting the language of feeling and identity, trans youth
indirectly asserted that their genders are as legitimate as cisgender people’s
whose identities as men and women society often treats as self-evident. In
some ways, these comments are a reminder that, while doing gender might
be “particularly salient” (Vidal-Ortiz 2009, 100) for trans people, drawing
unwanted attention to trans peoples’ genders can simplify lived experiences
and reinforce unwelcome distinctions.
Those who rejected the language of feeling or identity to talk about gender
often offered alternative conceptualizations. Some responded by emphasizing
the both/and nature of their identities:
I don’t necessarily identify as transgender because I am a girl, but am
also transgender. (18, transfeminine, BC)
I am a girl who is transgender. It’s not just a way I identify, it is what
I am. I am a transgender girl. (19, transfeminine, BC)
Others responded by distancing themselves from trans-specific language en-
tirely. As one youth explained, “some people that are trans do not like to be
called trans they prefer to be [known] as who they are and not labeled as trans
or any of that stuff” (17, transfeminine, Ontario). Those who rejected catego-
ries such as trans, trans*, or transgender often preferred to use binary gender
labels instead:
I usually just say “I’m a dude” because I’m binary trans and my parts
don’t always need introduction. (19, transmasculine, Prairie Provinces)
7 The original French reads: “Mais, c’est quoi exactement une identité transgenre? Je suis
trans* C’est un fait, c’est pas un choix.”
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I identify as a woman, but not really as Transgender. I didn’t choose to
be born in thewrong body and I don’t understand how I could consider
myself as having a Trans* identity. (20, transfeminine, Québec)8
I identify as a girl, not as the [transgender] label. I’mnot “guy that wants
to be a girl,” I’m a “girl with messed up genes.” (19, transfeminine,
Québec)
I don’t like to use the word trans to describemyself, but simply see my-
self as a man with a history of transition. (20, transmasculine, Ontario)
As the last comment suggests, this distancing from trans labels was often
connected to a linear understanding of transition as a journey with a begin-
ning, a middle, and an end. The end of one’s transition frequently marks the
moment that trans labels become irrelevant:
I’m technically trans and have transitioned, but I don’t identify as
transgender anymore. (25, transmasculine, Atlantic Provinces)
When I went full-time, I stopped telling people I was trans and only
identify as female. (23, transfeminine, Prairie Provinces)
I see transgender more as a state of being when in flux than an identity.
I identify as female, yet while transitioning I am transgender. Once my
surgery is complete, I will no longer be in flux, and as such I will no lon-
ger be transgender. (19, transfeminine, BC)
In these comments, youth acknowledge a connection between past and
present but only to assert that trans identification no longer matters.
This distancing is only available for those who engage in binary transitions
and can be read as (cisgender) men and women, as this comment illustrates:
“many people just want to pass and once they have transitioned they do
not really want to be separated out from cis people” (23, transmasculine, Qué-
bec). In a cisnormative society where only binary genders are intelligible, non-
binary people do not experience transition in a way that their gender will ulti-
mately be read accurately or unremarkably by other people.Theywill always be
“separated out from cis people.” Nonbinary respondents regularly noted this
difficulty in response to a question about whether they currently lived in their
felt gender: “I’mnonbinary/genderqueer.Most days I feel like there is no way
8 The original French reads: “Je m’identifie comme femme, mais pas vraiment comme
Transgenre. Je n’ai pas choisi de naître dans le mauvais corps et je ne comprends pas comment
je pourrais considérer que j’ai une identité Trans*”; translation ours.
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for me to actually live in my ‘felt gender’ in a way that other people can under-
stand when they look at me” (21, nonbinary, Atlantic Provinces).
Being able to distance oneself from trans labels often implies having the
means to blend into a world of binary gender norms. The means can be ma-
terial (i.e., access to hormonal, cosmetic, and/or surgical interventions) and/
or social (i.e., having a supportive family to facilitate access to social transition
before puberty). Unequal distribution of these means suggests that we can-
not disentangle the social and institutional contexts shaping peoples’ com-
plex relationships with trans labels (Valentine 2007) and underlines the need
for further analysis that can take an intersectional approach. Unfortunately,
the type of data andmakeup of our sample made it difficult for us to substan-
tiate patterns between youth of different racial/ethnic, class, or geographic
backgrounds.
Although no participant expressed a sense of superioritywith respect to their
distancing from trans labels, it is worth acknowledging that a cultural emphasis
on being read as cisgender has historically created hierarchies between those
who can do so and those who cannot, or will not (Shelley 2008). Such distanc-
ing is highly ambivalent because it can be both a strategic and divisive practice.
Passing as a cisgender person, for example, can be a survival strategy for helping
trans individuals navigate potentially risky spaces like gender-segregated wash-
rooms—even as this distancing can also effectively renaturalize binary gendered
norms. Although binary trans people should be no more responsible for chal-
lenging the gender binary andgendered norms than anyone else, it is important
to pay attention to how inequalities play out within trans populations and who
might be privileged by certain narratives of gender. This would draw our atten-
tion to how such divisions, for example,may riskmarginalizing underprivileged
trans and/or nonbinary people.
Bioessentialism: Transsexualism as a medical condition
Finally, some youth—especially transmasculine respondents—expressed a
preference for the term “transsexual” over transgender or trans*. For them,
this term made a clear distinction between gender and sex, which clarified
that their problem comes from their sex (as physical characteristics and/or
birth assignment) and not their gender:
i prefer the word “transsexual” as i am adjusting my physical sex rather
than gender presentation, role or identity. (21, transmasculine, BC)
I prefer to call myself transsexual, since my problem is that I would like
to change my sex. (15, transmasculine, Ontario)
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I am a transsexual man.My issue lies in my physical sex. I am not trans-
gender because my issues do not lie with my gender. (19, trans-
masculine, BC)
Technically I am a transsexual female.My sex is changing frommtf.My
gender [has] not change[d] at all, it’s female already. (14, trans-
feminine, Ontario)
I identify as transsexual, and not as transgender. My gender is binary
and has never changed. I am only adapting my body. (24, trans-
masculine, Québec)9
In these narratives, gender is framed as an unchangeable fact. Sex, however,
can change, and youth specifically mentioned access to medical interven-
tions (especially gender-affirming surgery) as a means to correct their “sex”:
Since I am [pursuing] surgery, I am transsexual, not transgender. (18,
transmasculine, BC)
I prefer the term transsexual, personally. As it is not just my gender
that I feel is opposite but my sex. I have also had surgery. (20,
transmasculine, BC)
Transsexual refers to changing the physical characteristics of sex, which
is what I have done via medical transition. My gender has always been
male, my sex at birth was wrong. Therefore I identify as a man who has
the medical condition of being transsexual. (24, transmasculine, BC)
The last comment makes clear that this perspective was intertwined with a
medicalized framework. Several youth called transsexuality a “medical con-
dition” (19, transmasculine, BC) or “birth defect” (25, transfeminine, On-
tario), while others compared themselves to people who have a cleft palate
or cancer. Within this framework, the condition of transsexualism is a
medical problem with a medical solution. The following comment encapsu-
lates such logic: “Gender is neurological sex. When this does not match the
body, this causes dysphoria, which is alleviated by transition. I do not like
the ‘identity’ model, as there is nothing spiritual about this medical condi-
tion” (15, transmasculine, Ontario). As the above comment shows, such
medicalization often comes with a rejection of what this young person calls
the “‘identity’ model,” which we discussed in the previous section.
9 The original French reads: “Je m’identifie comme transsexuel, et non transgenre. Mon
genre est binaire et n’a jamais changé. Je n’adapte que mon corps”; translation ours.
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In foregrounding medicine and framing gender as a fixed biological fact,
these comments draw a clear separation between trans people who alter their
sexed bodies viamedical interventions and thosewho do not. They often nat-
uralize gender by affirming its truth through a biological basis, often located
in the brain, as in this comment: “I don’t agree with this ‘gender identity’
nonsense. some important bits of my brain are male, but the rest of my body
is female, which causesme discomfort” (15, transmasculine,Ontario). “Sex is
physical, Gender is mental,” wrote one 19-year-old transfeminine youth
fromQuébec. “Note that while sex can be changed somewhat, gender CAN-
NOT be changed; thus the issue.” This essentialist view of gender as hard-
wired, which implies sexual dimorphism (the existence of distinct “male”
and “female” brains), has been contested and refuted by numerous schol-
ars.10 These comments build toward a fixed notion of gender, reliant on bi-
ology to assert itself as real. In contrast, elements constitutive of sex (anatomy
and hormones) are framed as modifiable or even fixable by medicine.
Discussion
We have presented a range of views on gender and sex that young people
shared in the CTYHS. In comments that drew on the lens of social construc-
tion, both sex and gender comeunder scrutiny as being dependent on human
interpretation and social context. As a result, definitions of sex and gender
varied among youth. Some insisted on differentiating the two terms, while
others seemed to collapse them. For some youth, it was crucial to talk about
gender rather than sex; for others, it was simply a question of clarifying that
gender determines sex and not the other way around. The organizing prin-
ciple across the social construction comments was that because sex and gen-
der are contingent on social definitions (rather than objective reality), self-
definition should be prioritized. As a result, many comments written from
that perspective implicitly and sometimes explicitly embraced themultiplicity
of genders and sexes.
In comments that drew instead on the language of bioessentialism, gender
was framed as the core of a person’s truth: gender is an objective and un-
changeable fact about someone, while sex is malleable—specifically modifi-
able via medical interventions. This perspective complicates the traditional
script of biological essentialism, which locates the “truth” of the gendered
self in sex (including reproductive organs, hormones, and chromosomes).
10 See Fausto-Sterling (2000), Hubbard (2001), Fine (2011), Gauthier (2014), and
Saewyc (2017).
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Sari Van Anders (2014) describes several forms of “bio/logics” that are “im-
plicit and/or explicit reasoning guides informed by features thought to be
natural, corporeal, evolved, andmaterial” (33). Thesemake it difficult to rec-
ognize gender/sex transitions because they define sex (and thus gender)
through features that are mostly unchangeable: interior bio/logics give pri-
macy to the least changeable or visible corporeal features of sex (i.e., genes);
trace bio/logics treat gender/sex as immutable by privileging “corporeal fea-
tures that influence later sex development . . . as determinants of gender/sex”
(i.e., hormones released fromgonads; 34); and newborn bio/logics prioritize
the sex assignment made by doctors at birth, based on the displayable body.
While youth in the CTYHS generally refused these three specific forms of
bio/logics and their denial of trans subjectivities, they did not refuse the un-
derlying principle that “biological factors are both deterministic to and the
essence of specific human phenomena” (Van Anders 2014, 33). Instead,
some saw the brain and its wiring as the biological factor most deterministic
of a person’s sex/gender. Building on Van Anders’s typology, this under-
standing of gender/sex could be called “cognitive bio/logics”—one that re-
lies on a primacy of biology but favors the brain as the location of fundamen-
tal truth. On the surface, cognitive bio/logics is compatible with some of the
criticisms of essentialism that feminists, gender scholars, and trans activists
have articulated over the years. Yet instead of questioning who has the power
of definition, it reinvests truth in a different location. Some participants who
articulated such perspectives did so alongside a belief that medical authority
can renaturalize trans people’s sex through surgico-medical interventions,
thereby voiding the original—and incorrect—sex assignment made at birth.
This suggests that cognitive bio/logics might be compatible with a reartic-
ulation of newborn bio/logics and its exteriorization of the truth of gen-
der/sex in the displayable body.
This shift in essentialist discourse is not unique to these youth. It is reflected
in popular discourse through narratives of “being born in the wrong body” or
having a “boy brain in a girl’s body” aswell asmuch of themedical literature on
the cognitive origins of gender identity disorder going back several decades
(Money 1994; Swaab 2004; Nota et al. 2017). As we note above, cognitive
bio/logics share foundational assumptions with a larger popular-scientific dis-
course that asserts the existence of fundamental differences in female and male
brains (Hines 2010; Miller and Halpern 2014). Our purpose in this article is
not to add to existing critiques of various forms of bioessentialism.11 Rather,
we aim to capture the ways some youth have adapted essentialist discourse
11 See Fausto-Sterling (2012), Fine (2014), Gauthier (2014), and Roy (2016).
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to a cultural context that increasingly recognizes trans subjectivities. In a con-
text receptive to this line of argument, essentialist arguments can be “not only a
necessary evil, but positively desirable” (Jansen 2016, 123).
Whether they drew on social constructivist, essentialist, or mixed per-
spectives, all the comments by youth on the CTYHS shared a key commit-
ment to trans people’s claims for legitimacy by asserting that the genders of
trans people are real. Youth differed in how they articulated that commit-
ment: by questioning how the categories of sex and gender come to be un-
derstood, by questioning the language we use to talk about gender and sex,
or by shifting the location of the true gendered self (in the features of the
brain rather than in bodily characteristics assigned to binary sexes). Despite
some fundamental differences, these perspectives all respond to the denial of
trans subjectivity that has defined trans people’s experiences in our society
(Namaste 2000; Shelley 2008; Spade 2011). Based on quantitative ratings,
youth rated lowest (2.49/5) and provided one of the fewest numbers of
comments (n 5 38) to the question about sex assigned at birth—perhaps
another indication of the concern and frustration that all youth felt toward
questions that they read as failing to give primacy to trans people’s own
sense of self.
A key distinction between these perspectives is the room they make for
genders and sexes beyond binaries. By virtue of its questioning of existing
categories, the social construction perspective easily accommodates the idea
of gender and sex as spectra rather than binaries. Gender and sex spectra
make it possible to acknowledge nonbinary as well as intersex subjectivities,
although youth rarely explicitly discussed the latter. Comments from our
nonbinary youth respondents often used the language of social construc-
tion, suggesting that it resonated with their experiences.
In contrast, the desire to reject trans labels highlights the privileging of
trans subjectivities that are more easily integrated into the existing binary
gender system after transition. The language of bioessentialism validates these
experiences without clearly acknowledging nonbinary genders. Indeed, theo-
ries that argue gender has a biological basis in the brain have historically been
tightly attached to binary conceptions of gender (Fausto-Sterling 2000). One
of our respondents explicitly demonstrated this by claiming that there is “no
scientific evidence” that nonbinary genders exist, adding “gender-creative isn’t
a real thing” (19, transmasculine, BC). The data limits our capacity to analyze
the institutional and social factors that shape how youth come to articulate
their experiences through a bioessentialist lens. Regardless, this neoessentialist
framework risks creating a hierarchy of legitimacy that privileges trans people
whose gender can be located in some aspects of the brain according to estab-
lished cisnormative frameworks of science; namely, trans people whose brains
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resemble those of their cisgender counterparts (Rametti et al. 2011). Within
the realm of research, it encourages investigative and analytical approaches that
ignore and render invisible both intersex and nonbinary people who do not
have cisgender counterparts to legitimize their existence (Frohard-Dourlent
et al. 2016).
The work of critical gender scholars, feminists, and trans activists seems to
have had an impact on multiple perspectives discussed in this article. These
often-overlapping groups have long been in dialogue as well as tension with
each other (Enke 2012; Serano 2013), helping shift discourses about gender
by questioning and challenging assumptions about the immutability of the
cisnormative gender order. Over the course of the past fifty years, these the-
oretical challenges have slowly opened up possibilities for new subjectivities
while giving more space to trans perspectives. This legacy is most obvious
in the social construction perspective that some youth articulated: their lan-
guage and arguments echoed gender scholarship and activism, although it is
impossible for us to explain where they acquired this fluency. The perspective
of bioessentialism, however, has also integrated some feminist insights on
gender and sex in order to account for trans lives. Specifically, it has incorpo-
rated the distinction between sex as physical characteristics and gender as in-
ternal sense of self, a definition that has become a staple of introductory social
science textbooks (see, e.g., Little 2013). This perspective, for which we owe
thanks to early feminism (e.g., Beauvoir 1952), was crucial in challenging the
assumption that sex determines howone acts or should act—even as it left sex
an unquestioned biological category (Fausto-Sterling 2003).
Instead of integrating more recent feminist insights, this modern medical
essentialism appropriates early feminist discourse to locate a biological es-
sence in gender rather than in sex. This neoessentialism may have some po-
litical efficacy in certain contexts but may also come at the price of relinquish-
ing the authority of whose bodies and genders matter (and thus, whose do
not) to medical professionals. Experiences from the LGBQ movement and
critiques of the “born this way” narrative warn us about how this type of es-
sentialism can redraw the boundaries of legitimacy rather than expand them
in an inclusive manner (Wade 2011; Walters 2011).
All the perspectives we discussed differ in some way from the still-
dominant understanding of gender as immutable, biologically determined,
and binary. Although the medicalization of gender diversity likely impacts
some trans youth’s lived experiences with gender (Johnson 2015), the rela-
tionship between the two is not straightforward. Our findings raise the ques-
tion of how youth come to conceptualize gender in a variety of newways. Be-
cause we lack context for youth respondents’ comments, we can only make
inferences about how theywere exposed to the different perspectives we have
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analyzed in this article. Some possibilities include postsecondary education,
involvement in activist circles in person and online, interactions with medical
professionals, and general-audience bookswritten by feminist and trans activ-
ists as well as psychologists. None of these modes of involvement and inter-
actions would guarantee a uniform perspective of gender, as significant ten-
sions about how to think through gender and sex remain among gender
scholars, feminists, and trans activists (Noble 2012; Elliot 2016) as well as
in the health care literature (Perone 2014; Dewey and Gesbeck 2017).
Conclusion
When we started the CTYHS, we knew that asking about gender in large-
scale population health surveys was a complicatedmatter.We are not the first
ones to ponder this conundrum.12 Valentine (2007, 25) reminds us that “lan-
guage is a central site—theoretically, practically, politically, and ethically—
for the negotiation of meanings in any field.” It appears to be especially so
in trans-related research, since both the awareness of and the vocabulary
surrounding sex and gender are rapidly changing. The comments analyzed
in this article show us that there is little youth consensus regarding language
or conceptualizations of gender and sex. The same questions were simulta-
neously praised and criticized by youth, who argued in thoughtful and pas-
sionate ways how language reflected (or did not reflect) the truth of their
experiences.
These tensions and disagreements also point to the long-noted difficulty
that survey methodologies encounter when attempting to collect demo-
graphic information about genders and sexualities (Stacey and Thorne
1985; Harding 1987; Westbrook and Saperstein 2015). Yet there is extraor-
dinary energy to be found in how young people engaged with the CTYHS
questions. Their comments were a sign of their commitment to making sure
that we, the researchers, got feedback onmore inclusive, resonant, and accu-
rate ways to ask about their experiences, bodies, and genders. We wanted to
write this article not only to explore the multiple ways trans youth talk about
gender and sex but also to wrestle with their feedback and consider its impli-
cations. The two perspectives discussed are hardly easy to reconcile. The
comments left by trans youth show that they, just like larger transgender
12 See Conron and Austin (2008), Gender Identity in U.S. Surveillance Group (2014),
Reisner et al. (2015), and Bauer et al. (2017).
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and cisgender populations, have complicated relationships to, and under-
standings of, what gender and sexmightmean for them.When language fluc-
tuates, it is all the more difficult for researchers (even when they are part of
that community) to determine how to engage and formulate their research
in a way that is accessible, inclusive, and informative.
We come away from this article not with easy answers but with a renewed
commitment to engagewith youth aswedevelop future projects and formulate
future surveys. However, this lack of answers should not be read as relativist
abdication; just because all language has flaws does not mean that some lan-
guage is not better than others. When quantitatively rating the CTYHS’s
gender-related questions (see table 1), youth in the CTYHS indicated a slight
preference for questions with the most inclusive definitions and questions
with the most options to choose from, including an open-ended field. Most
recently, some of the authors on our team have developed a survey on gender-
affirming surgery with the trans health program of a local health authority (see
Frohard-Dourlent, Coronel Villalobos, and Saewyc 2017). For that survey,
having learned from our experience with the CTYHS and having consulted
a peer reference group, we chose to ask about gender in a two-step manner.
First, we asked people to identify their gender in an open-ended field; then,
to look for gendered inequities through quantitative analysis of groups, we
asked people to identify with one of three categories: transfeminine/woman/
MtF, transmasculine/man/FtM, and nonbinary/genderqueer. This approach
seems to have resonated with our respondents, because it allowed them to
express their gender identities in their ownwords, thus recognizing the com-
plexity of identity and relationships to various identity terms that surfaced
amongCTYHS respondents. This approach also recognized the researchers’
analytical need for categories but did so by empowering participants to
choose how they would classify themselves based on three gender options
that were inclusive of nonbinary and gender-nonconforming identities. This
is preferable to an analyst classifying participants into three options based on
the analyst’s interpretation of the open-ended responses. This positive out-
come encourages us to try a similar approach in the future when we explore
this question with youth next time, although the shifting terrain of gender
and sex will require us to consult with youth directly again.
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